عنوان مقاله [English]
Iran's military policy in the second Pahlavi era is a topic that has drawn researchers' interest. However, they begin their research with the August 19 coup d'état. What has here been overlooked is the military policies of Iran and the United States in the pre-coup period. With this in mind, the present paper raises the main question of the military policies of USA and Iran from the end of World War II to the coup to find out what military strategy each of the two countries pursued at this particular time. Another related question concerns the tactics used by them to make the strategies operational. A historical method and the use of documents were used to answer these questions. The research hypothesis is based on the fact that the US, for political and military reasons, insisted on maintaining Iran's independence through "political means", while Mohammad Reza Shah insisted on military reinforcement. The findings of the study also show that due to the US dominance in the sphere of Iran's military policy in this period, the US finally had its own way in terms of its favorite military strategy and acted on not equipping the Iranian army until the August 19 coup.